Why We're Affected by Secondary Telecommunication Laws

The following is translated from Christian Coquet's Té de Tecno, a Mexican blog about technology "in service of the Geek community". It's been nearly two weeks after it was first posted so I'm glad to add it hasn't come to pass - yet.

You can find the original text, in Spanish, here.

Many things are lost in translation. Feel free to point out any mistakes I might've made. Thanks!



Mexico could enter a select group of countries which none of its citizens would’ve wanted it to; in the list there’s Turkey, Egypt, China, Russia, North Korea, and countries where their governments or authorities practice Internet censorship.

And it’s because some secondary telecommunication laws are fearsome, when they contemplate blocking communication, real-time geographical localisation of any device, and blocking access to websites, their content, and applications.

Article 145: the providers could block access to certain content, applications, or services with the express request of the user, when there is an order from an authority or they conflict with any legislation.

If we didn’t think with dirty minds, we could imagine this article would attempt to prevent the access to websites with malware, scams, that promote violence, digital piracy or even worse, security.

But which authority and what kind of content are not clear. It could talk about blogs, YouTube channels, websites, or opinions against any public servant.

Article 189: it forces providers to give the geographical location, in real time, of any communication device with the request of the titular of security agencies or public servants who have this faculty delegated upon them.

This could become a double-edged sword; while it does allow intelligence agencies to locate and trace delinquents, it could also benefit any corrupt authority who’d want to trace the location of a potential victim of crime, such as kidnapping or murder.

Article 197: it orders telecommunications service providers to “block, inhibit, or override temporarily telecommunication signals in events and places critical to public and national security, with the request of competent authorities”.

This article enables the “competent authority” to block Internet during political demonstrations, preventing the sharing of evidence of authority abuse as has been the case in other countries and been shared worldwide.

It’s added in articles 190 and 191 the allowance of State intervention of private communication, while article 192 orders providers to keep a two-year controlled record of users and their communications.

If you think this is serious, wait! – this information can be accessed by the Public Prosecutor, Federal Police, Army, Navy, and any other authority who’d want to take a look at any kind of communication between two users.

All of the above ignores UN and the OAS’s recommendations about freedom of speech and Internet access, which include not blocking communication among people or groups of users.

José González Morfín, President of the House of Representatives, frosted the cake when he curtly stated that there was no going back with the reforms, as he called legislators to approve them soon (in less than ten days, according to Morfín).

So this text, thousands of signatures, massive demonstrations, or reccomendations by international organisations will be for nothing because ina few days we’ll be breaking in new laws and regulations that can be used against us, affecting the privacy and freedom of speech of millions of Mexicans.